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Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-




Property rights in a particular resource commonly are splintered among
different owners. To account for this possibility, some legal commentators refer to
the maximal set of ownership entitlements in a specific asset as a bundle that can
potentially be disaggregated through consensual transactions or otherwise. This
conception is often expressed in terms of a bundle of rights. For reasons that will
become clear, I instead invoke the image of a “bundle of sticks,” an only slightly less
popular metaphor for the same idea. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, a premier judicial
wordsmith, is conventionally credited with having first likened a set of full property
entitlements to a bundle of firewood.2 And in several opinions, Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States have invoked this image to describe the fullest
possible set of private property rights.3
In this usage, bundle of sticks is a metaphor. Metaphors, unlike synonyms, are
invariably inexact and therefore potentially misleading. I anticipate that contribu-
tors to this symposium will highlight two types of mischief that the metaphor may
cause. First, the conception that property rights come in bundles that are easily
fragmented may be descriptively inapt because various legal rules limit a property
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1. Yale Law School, New Haven, CT 06511.
2. “The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not constant through
the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to time” (Cardozo 1928, 129).
3. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979, 176) (referring to “sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property”); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002, 278) (“A common idiom
describes property as a ‘bundle of sticks’…”).
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owner’s powers to disaggregate ownership. This theme has been central in the
work of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith (2001b and forthcoming), the leading
critics of the bundle metaphor. Second, the metaphor may have negative normative
consequences because it wrongly implies that the disaggregation of entitlements is
unlikely to affect social welfare. According to Merrill and Smith, the legal realists
who promoted the bundle-of-sticks metaphor had a political agenda, namely,
dethroning the sanctity of private property and the private ordering it enables in
order to enhance levels of “collective control and redistribution” (forthcoming,
11–12). Merrill and Smith themselves are more skeptical than the legal realists
of the relative efficacy of collective control. They therefore object to the bundle
metaphor partly because it is likely to foster legal measures that will lead to
excessive splintering of entitlements in private resources. By and large, I agree
with both of Merrill and Smith’s criticisms. Nonetheless, at the end of the day
my assessment of the bundle-of-sticks metaphor is more charitable than theirs.
In my view, the metaphor has come into common usage because it highlights
an important feature of a private property system that lawyers and law students
might otherwise have difficulty grasping. I therefore urge legal commentators not
to abandon the bundle-of-sticks metaphor, but rather to be aware of its limitations
and to invent complementary metaphors that might counter the bundle’s
shortcomings.
The Merits of the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor
Virtually all American law schools require their students to enroll in an
introductory course on Property. After spending a month or two on other issues,
a Property instructor usually assigns a block of readings that depict how “full”
ownership of a property interest may be fragmented among various partial
entitlement holders. An illustration may help. Suppose that at the outset O owns
a pasture known as Whiteacre in fee simple. (In Anglo-American law, fee simple
denotes the fullest possible form of ownership, one that lasts in perpetuity.)
Through voluntary acts, O might fragment rights in Whiteacre along at least the
following five dimensions:
(1) subdivision of Whiteacre into parcels of lesser acreage. O might, for
example, divide Whiteacre into two parcels, Blackacre and Redacre, retain
ownership of Blackacre, and sell Redacre in fee simple to neighbor N.
(2) decomposition of particular privileges of use. Thereafter O might, for
example, sell mineral rights in Blackacre to an oil company, enter into a grazing
lease with farmer F, and grant N a easement entitling N to cross Blackacre to access
Redacre.
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(3) temporal limitations on entitlements. O could limit a transferee’s rights
to a less-than-infinite period of time, and also create various forms of future in-
terests. For example, O could limit F’s lease of grazing rights on Blackacre to a
one-year term starting immediately, and simultaneously negotiate with farmer G
a follow-on lease whose one-year term would commence as soon as F’s lease had
come to an end.
(4) concurrent ownership. To make matters yet more complex, O’s follow-
on grazing lessee might be with not just one farmer (G), but with three (G, H, and
I), who would concurrently own undivided interests in the lease.
(5) security interests. O, after entering into all of the above transactions,
might grant M a security interest in Blackacre to secure a loan that M had made to
O.
Although most of the partial interests mentioned in this example—leases,
mortgages, easements—are in no way exotic, their concatenation is likely to make
a beginning law student’s head spin. To help beleaguered students, a teacher of
Property therefore might invoke a metaphor. O, the instructor might say, once had
a full bundle of sticks, but has since chosen to deal off specific sticks to a variety of
transferees. “Aha,” say the students. “That’s clarifying.”
The Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor Slights
Agglomeration Effects
At this point, however, a teacher of Property should also note the limitations
of the bundle metaphor that Merrill and Smith, among others, have identified. The
market value of a bundle of sticks of firewood is roughly twice the market value
of half the same bundle of sticks. In other words, the bundling or unbundling
of packets of firewood seldom gives rise to either agglomeration gains or
agglomeration losses. The decomposition of interests in many other resources, by
contrast, commonly is either value-reducing or value-enhancing.
Potential losses from fragmentation. The bundle metaphor implies that there is no
rationale for unifying the entitlements in a particular resource in a single private
owner. This implication is flatly erroneous. It is hardly news that the value of a
whole may exceed the sum of the values of its parts. For example, when two
or more individuals share access to the same resource, each of them may
opportunistically overuse it, undermaintain it, or torpedo plans for cooperative
endeavor. The fragmentation of rights among partial owners thus introduces risks
of tragedies of the commons (Hardin 1968) and anticommons (Heller 1998).
Partial owners must either put up with the losses this opportunism causes or incur
the transaction costs of either controlling each other’s opportunism or buying
TWO CHEERS FOR THE BUNDLE METAPHOR
VOLUME 8, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2011 217
each other out. These sorts of downsides of property fragmentation have figured
prominently in the influential work of Michael Heller (1998; 2008). At the extreme,
Heller might analogize full ownership of a resource not to a bundle of sticks but
to a complete deck of 52 cards. In many contexts, the loss of a single card from a
complete deck renders the remaining 51 cards virtually worthless.
Venerable enthusiasts of the bundle metaphor, such as Thomas Grey (1980)
and the legal realists, seldom confronted this downside of fragmentation. Many
policy analysts remain oblivious to it. For example, to make tenure in a single-family
house more affordable, some commentators have proposed the creation of land
trusts to acquire and lease the lands under houses (e.g., Kelly 2009) and the sale
of shares of home equity to non-occupying investors (Caplin et al 1997). In most
contexts, these sorts of arrangements would overly complicate governance of the
shared real estate and thereby reduce, not enhance, the total value of the interests in
it (Ellickson 2008, 85–86).
There also is evidence that, all else equal, most individuals are psychologically
disposed to prefer a full bundle of rights in a resource. Jonathan Remy Nash and
Stephanie Stern (2010) devised a survey instrument to test the effects of what they
call “property frames.” Their respondents expressed a relative dissatisfaction with
policies that confer less than full ownership.
Potential benefits of fragmented ownership. In many contexts, however, the carving
out of partial interests in a resource can be value-enhancing.4 The value of an
apartment development, for example, lies in its owner’s power to enter into leases,
each of which presumably generates gains from trade for both the landlord and the
tenant. A well-designed private property system therefore must enable many forms
of consensual, and sometimes even nonconsensual, decomposition. In contexts
where the disaggregation of property rights would greatly enhance value, full
property rights might be better analogized not to a bundle of sticks but to a
wholesale lot of rabbits’ feet. Because no individual desires to permanently possess
a raft of good-luck charms, the value of the wholesale lot arises almost entirely out
of the possibility of its future disaggregation.
A Few Friendly Criticisms of Merrill and
Smith’s Essentialist View of Private Property
Merrill and Smith’s writings have permanently altered legal academic
thinking about the nature of private property. Drawing on James Penner (1997) and
4. This is the basis of Richard Epstein’s (2010, 462–472) spirited defense of an owner’s powers to transfer
particular sticks in a bundle.
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others, they have resurrected the important truth that the in rem quality of property
rights makes this legal category distinctive. They have persuasively argued that the
law of private property is shaped largely to reduce the informational burdens of
the owners and non-owners who have to cope with the system. As mentioned,
they have also stressed the inconsistency of the bundle-of-sticks metaphor with
the actual principles of Anglo-American property law. In their maiden venture as
co-authors, Merrill and Smith (2000) defended, for example, the numerus clausus
principle that limits the menu of possible interests that an owner may create
through voluntary transactions. In their view, the law is hostile to the introduction
of new forms of property interests because the introduction of a “fancy” may
increase informational burdens on those not involved in the transaction. If the
law were to permit the creation of endlessly exotic forms of land ownership, for
example, an entrepreneur might be deterred from trying to assemble land parcels.
Many other property rules, such as an owner’s robust right to exclude, the doctrine
of adverse possession, and the rule against perpetuities, similarly reduce the
informational burdens of the system.
Hats off, then, to Merrill and Smith. That said, I now briefly identify three
issues on which my take is somewhat different from theirs.
First, because Merrill and Smith define “property” as an entitlement in a
“thing” as opposed to a “person” (2007, 18–19), they are unwilling to refer to
a person’s rights in his own body, labor, and reputation as property. Why this
definitional timidity? Returns to human capital constitute approximately three-
quarters of GDP. Slavery, the most contested legal issue in U.S. history, involved
rules governing the ownership of labor. Because property concepts can help clarify
analysis of these momentous legal issues, it is not apparent why property scholars
should cede, on the altar of definitional purity, this entire territory to other legal
specialists.
Second, Merrill and Smith, in their understandable passion to rehabilitate a
robust conception of private property from the onslaught it has endured over the
course of the twentieth century, at times exaggerate the role of private property in
the overall system of resource management. For example, the first chapter of their
superb property casebook (2007) carries the title, “What Is Property?” By this, it
becomes clear, they actually mean another question: “What Is Private Property?”
On that issue, they distinguish between the “essentialist” view that “property” has
a core meaning as a legal concept, and the skeptical view that it is a bundle of sticks
whose composition may vary widely from context to context (2007, 15-16). Merrill
(1998), even before he joined forces with Smith, had declared that he embraced
an essentialist view of private property. In their casebook, Merrill and Smith
nonetheless tactfully decline to reveal the depth of their disdain for the bundle
metaphor.
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Merrill and Smith’s casebook rightly places private property at center stage.
Private property abounds in a market economy and is the form of greatest concern
to both transactional lawyers and civil libertarians. But as Merrill and Smith know
as well as anyone, even in market economies many valuable resources are not, and
as a normative matter should not be, held in private ownership. The high seas, for
example, are open-access resources that anyone can navigate, and many intellectual
creations are in the public domain (that is, usable without charge). In ordinary
speech, neither a pasture shared by villagers nor a common area in a condominium
project is likely to be described as private property. Another phrase, perhaps limited-
access commons, might better describe these arrangements (see generally Ellickson
1993, 1322–23). It is notable that in U.S. legal education, the names of most of
the basic private-law courses are plurals—Contracts, Torts, Business Associations.
Merrill and Smith perhaps should consider the virtues of retitling their casebook
“Property Institutions,” and its first chapter, “What Are the Forms of Property?”
Third, Merrill and Smith rarely discuss the reality that affirmative duties may
automatically attach to private ownership. They indeed have boldly asserted that
any in rem duties of property owners, such as the duty of a landowner to refrain
from carrying out a nuisance activity, are always negative (Merrill and Smith 2001a,
783, 789). This oversimplifies. The law may affirmatively require a landowner, for
example, to control natural vegetation (Jones 1994) or to contribute to the costs
that an abutting neighbor has incurred to fence a common boundary (Ellickson
1991, 65–81). One commentator (Ouellette 2011) supports imposing on each
patent holder an affirmative duty to explain the nature of the patented invention to
other researchers.
It is easy to understand why Merrill and Smith would tend to resist the notion
that property ownership may come laden with affirmative in rem duties. Because
they generally favor the simple packaging of entitlements, they are undoubtedly
averse to layering on additional complexities. In many contexts, moreover, prop-
erty owners may be able to use contracts or norms to elicit affirmative contrib-
utions from one another. Because Merrill and Smith exalt owner sovereignty, they
likely would tend to prefer coordination by means of those mechanisms, as
opposed to legal compulsion. Most important, they are acutely aware that some
prominent property scholars have been urging lawmakers to affirm that property
ownership entails broadly defined duties. Gregory Alexander (2009), for example,
favors explicit legal recognition that an owner is bound by a “social-obligation
norm,” and Joseph Singer (2009, 1048), by a general duty of “attentiveness.” Merrill
and Smith understandably would be skittish about how a sitting judge might apply
these amorphous concepts in a concrete case.
Yet, property law in fact does impose some narrowly circumscribed
affirmative duties on owners. If Merrill and Smith aspire to accurately describe the
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property system as it is, they might apply their exceptional analytical skills to this
understudied set of obligations, perhaps to conclude that the category is narrowly
cabined and should remain so.
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